

## The Ethics of Journalism

BY THOMAS F. WOODLOCK

WHEN Mr. Joseph Pulitzer endowed the School of Journalism at Columbia College he aroused a discussion in the newspaper press which was notable for two things. One was a substantial unanimity of editorial opinion to the effect that a "journalist" was born and not made, and that he could not be trained to any advantage except by actual practice in a real newspaper office. Where editors descended to particulars, these usually took the form of a statement that the "news instinct" was incomunicable to one who had it not, and that one who had it needed no training for his task of the kind that could be given him in class. Only in a real newspaper office could the fortunate possessor of the "instinct" be made worth his salt. Some editors suggested that while it would be easy enough to make "journalists" in a school of journalism, "newspaper men" could not be thus produced. The distinction is a favorite one with the "newspaper man" of fiction, but it need not now detain us. Of more interest is the second notable fact alluded to above as characterizing the discussion of Mr. Pulitzer's gift, viz., that so far as the writer's memory serves him, neither those who attacked the proposition nor those who defended it seemed to be aware of the existence of any first principles, fundamental laws of right and wrong, having nothing to do with grammar, style, typography—nor even news instinct!—which could or should be taught and taught formally as applicable to the practice of journalism.

Not Mr. Pulitzer himself seemed even to suspect the existence of such principles—much less some of his critics. He vigorously defended the practicability of teaching the budding young “journalist” how to use his tools of trade, and, one may admit, had much the better of the argument on this score. But of the “ethics” of journalism he had little to say beyond the statement that the truth must be told at all hazards. This is good, but is it all?

Some years ago the New York *Times* announced its motto as “All the news that’s fit to print.” Later the New York *Press* stated that while some of the papers told “All the Truth some mornings,” and others “Some of the Truth every morning,” it proposed to itself the motto “All the Truth every morning.”

These mottoes express very definite differences of principle and, if carried out in practice, could produce results differing as widely as the poles. The *Press* crisply claims all truth as its province; the *Times* recognizes that some truth is not “fit to print,” rather implying limitations as dictated by the vague canons of good taste. Which of these newspapers is right? Are there any fundamental principles or “ethics” of “journalism” other than God’s Commandment against lying? If there are, what are they?

It is the purpose of this article to show that there are such principles. The basic premise of the argument that will be offered is the existence of a general law of right and wrong which may be called the natural or the moral law, and which, according to a learned writer, “is the most comprehensive of all laws. Every conceivable free action with every conceivable variety of circumstances is definitely provided for by the natural law. . . .

Every possible free action is either morally good, morally bad or morally indifferent." (*Rev. E. J. O'Reilly, S.J., "Relations of the Church to Society."*)

If the existence of such a law be denied *cadit quæstio*; but, if it be admitted, it is clear that those human activities which constitute the profession of journalism are provided for in the law, and the practice of journalism "ethically" stands or falls according to its conformity or otherwise with the law. Let it be noted that while most of the principles of the moral law are quite largely embodied in statute law and in the accepted principles of common law and equity, there is nevertheless much territory that is not thus specifically delimited, and must be surveyed specially with reference to a given point. Such a special survey is here attempted.

The inquiry naturally divides itself into two parts designed to furnish answers to the two questions: (1) What is the nature of the human activities comprised in journalism? (2) What dictates of the moral law apply to these activities? When these questions are answered the reader can form his own judgment as to the conditions existing in actual practice and their consequences to civil society.

It is convenient to speak of the "newspaper" as a true moral personality, for it must necessarily be the reflection of the mind of the editor who guides it and of his personality. A newspaper, indeed, is in effect the same thing as one individual talking to a multitude at one and the same time, printed symbols taking the place of the spoken word and discharging similar and equal functions. If the responsible editor of a newspaper were to rent a hall, assemble his readers therein, and, in the course of an address, communicate to them the contents

of his paper of that day, he would perform for them precisely the service that he performs daily by delivering his printed paper at their homes. The parallel would be perfect if, at such a meeting, with the responsible editor presiding, each reporter told his own story in turn, each editorial writer made his own argument, and each critic delivered his own judgment *ore rotundo*.

Human society consists of two essential elements. viz., people and government. The people are the body, and the government is the soul, which together constitute a moral living organism. It is impossible to conceive of society as an organism without order; it is impossible to conceive of order without law, and it is impossible to conceive of law without authority expressed in government. Government is exercised through individuals duly appointed for that purpose, discharging the functions of making laws, executing them and administering justice in accordance with the same. Powers necessary to the discharge of these functions are delegated to individuals who exercise them to the end that society may fulfil its destiny as appointed by the Creator. Broadly speaking, the rights enjoyed by individuals living in society divide themselves in two main classes: the rights inherent in the individual as such, and the rights given an individual appointed as an officer of government. The officer of the law has, by virtue of his office, powers and rights other than and beyond his rights as a private individual. To illustrate by an extreme case, it is right and proper for the sheriff of a county to execute a condemned criminal with his own hands; that is, to take human life in cold blood; a thing not permitted to a private citizen. In such case the sheriff is part of the machinery of government and thus acts by virtue thereof. The person

who is not part of government machinery has rights and powers equal to those of other private citizens, no more and no less, and, broadly speaking, there is little or no real difference between one private individual's rights and another's, no matter how diverse be their social activities.

Now the nature of the newspaper's rights and duties necessarily depends first, on whether or not it is to be regarded as a private citizen or as an individual charged with governmental duties of any kind. Can we regard the newspaper as charged with any of the three main functions of government: legislative, executive or judicial? "Trial by newspaper" is something that we have all heard of at times, but it is quite certain that neither the newspaper's verdict nor sentence is as yet allowed to have full judicial effect in society, and clearly the newspaper cannot be regarded as part of the judiciary.

The newspaper has never yet exercised the right of appointment directly, nor the police power, and cannot be held to be a branch of the executive in any degree. Nor has a newspaper-made and newspaper-promulgated law ever been regarded as binding upon the citizen of its own force. Not even the craziest of yellow journals has as yet claimed the force of statute law for its pronouncements. If the newspaper does not exercise judicial, executive or legislative functions, it cannot be held to be part of governmental machinery, and if it be no part of governmental machinery, it must be a purely private entity, as is the humblest of its readers. There is no middle position in the community; it must be either a public official or a private individual in face of the law. Therefore, in considering the activities of jour-

nalism, we have to remember that they fall within the domain of purely private activities as distinguished from those of a governmental character.

What is the essential activity of the newspaper, its characteristic function? It is the distribution to the public in general of "news" respecting men and things, together with comments and explanations. The great material achievements of "civilization," so-called, have been in the direction of facilitating human intercourse. The railroad and the steamboat have annihilated distance for the traveler and the trader, as the telegraph, the ocean cable and the telephone have annihilated space for the purpose of commerce. But as the rational and spiritual nature of man is higher than his corporal and animal nature, the things of the mind transcend in importance the things of the body, once the bare necessities of the body are supplied, and the newspaper gives to man that interchange of thought with his fellow-man which is at least as essential as the interchange of commodities. It brings to its reader daily the doings and the thought of the world, and, when all is said and done, the modern newspaper press is the strongest bond of modern human society. It connects, as by a network of countless threads, the minds of men so that they become one in the possession and appreciation of truth respecting the doings of men. It organizes men's opinions by feeding many men's minds with the same truths, so that the mind of the entire community, indeed the entire "civilized" world, throbs in one instant responsive to a single fact. The magnitude of the service rendered to mankind by the public press can only be realized by imagining the world deprived for a year, a month, a week, or even a day, of its newspapers!

The newspaper tells its readers about men and things. There are thus three distinct personalities involved in the case, viz.: (1) the newspaper, (2) the reader, (3) the person of whom something is printed. The question has to do with the relations of the newspaper with the other two.

The newspaper's relation to its reader is that of agent, if not, indeed, trustee. The newspaper implicitly but definitely agrees with its reader to furnish him with the "news." It is, therefore, obligated to him in the highest degree so far as one thing is concerned, and that is to furnish him with truth and nothing else. The newspaper which lies sins against its very nature, and the first law of its being is truth. A lie can be told in an infinite number of ways, all bad, and there are no conceivable circumstances which make a lie justifiable to a newspaper any more than to an individual. This gives us the first great limitation of territory; outside the boundary wall of the newspaper's lawful field lies all that is untrue.

Let it be noted in passing that the "subsidized" or "controlled" newspaper is itself a living lie, for it masquerades as something which it is not, viz., a free agent or trustee for the reader. So also the "reading notice," the "editorial puff," etc. The first requirement in the newspaper, so far as truth is concerned, is freedom in those who collect and disseminate the truth, and this freedom is lost when the editor wears some one's collar or consults the interests of any one before those of his readers. It is not a bad rule that the man who wants to edit a newspaper should own it, or at least 51 per cent of it.

Truth, from the newspaper's point of view, is the

truth defined by St. Thomas as *adæquatio rei et intellectus*—"the conformity of thought to thing." This requires the full apprehension of a truth by the newspaper in the first instance and in the second instance its conveyance to the reader, so that the reader's thought shall also conform to the thing, the medium of conveyance being the printed word. These being the activities of journalism, and these activities being necessarily confined within the domain of truth, we have to inquire: What dictates of the moral law apply to these activities? Considering first the relations of newspaper and reader, and excluding from the province of the newspaper all that is untrue, what limits, if any, must be placed upon the use of truth to prevent an injury to the reader for which the newspaper is responsible?

Clearly the limits indicated by the moral law in this case are whatever may be required to prevent the giving of scandal by the newspaper to the reader. Scandal is given by one person to another when the former in any way furnishes to another the occasion of a breach of the moral law in thought, word or deed, and whenever a newspaper, by its utterances, improperly excites the immoral passions of its readers, it offends and offends grievously. In certain matters the statute books recognize this principle, as, for example, in the case of *literæ obscenæ*, and the law most properly provides a penalty for the offender. The principle, however, holds good for breaches of all other Commandments. Moreover, even the ruthless process of law takes cognizance of the danger of giving scandal, for the hearing of cases *in camerâ* is by no means uncommon. Unfortunately, nowadays many people understand the word "morals" in a limited sense, forgetful of the fact that there are more passions

than one which can be excited to the point of sin, and many sins which may be committed in thought. Unjust anger, jealousy, avarice, envy, anarchy, unbelief, sacrilege: all these things and many others are matters of scandal-giving as between a newspaper and its readers, just as much as the matters of which the law takes cognizance. The moral responsibility, one may imagine, of a newspaper which, almost in so many words, counsels upon labor unions the doctrine of "Death to scabs!" is heavy indeed, even though it escape, thanks to editorial cunning, the wide meshes of the law. So, too, the moral responsibility of the "Sunday paper" with its "fake science" leading to irreligious conclusions in the minds of half-educated readers; so, too, the paper which bids its readers reflect upon the riches of others and what they would mean if they were taken away and distributed; so, too, many other papers doing similar things. The incitement to passion seems, indeed, the principal means by which the degenerate yellow journalism of today works to attain its unclean ends, whether they be money or power.

Let the reader, who thinks the giving of scandal by newspapers an uncommon thing, carefully read his morning or evening paper, a yellow sheet for choice, for a day or two from this special point of view. Not but what some of the "highly respectable" papers accomplish a good deal in this way themselves, as, for instance, certain newspaper with their thinly disguised hostility to all forms of religious belief, that publish editorials, for example, professing candidly to note and deplore the decay of religious faith, and occasionally charging ministers of religion as a class with bad faith, because they teach what they are assumed not to believe, probably work a great

deal of harm among the moderately equipped intellects of the *bourgeois*.

Is there in the newspaper press of today any large body of evidence showing recognition by editors of any duty toward their readers in this matter of scandal? Let the reader answer the question for himself, and in answering it let him remember that if there be a law of right and wrong at all, it runs in journalism as in all other human activities, that under the law the scandal-giver becomes partaker to the full in the wrong that he incites another to commit, and that while the statute books, after a fashion, partially protect the reader of a newspaper against scandal under the Sixth and Ninth Commandments, there are eight others on which the "news instinct" may trample unchecked for all that there is on the statute books or in modern newspaper practice to check it.

So much for the "ethics" of journalism as between the newspaper and the reader; what about the newspaper and the man of whom the newspaper has something to say? The witness in a court of law, summoned to testify for or against some one else, is admonished to tell "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth." Is this also the newspaper's duty? It assuredly is not. The newspaper is neither judge nor jury nor witness in a court of law. Its standing in court is precisely that of any one of the individual spectators who are private citizens. The libel law properly gives a newspaper no rights which an individual citizen does not enjoy. The rule or dictates of the moral law which govern the speech of man as regards his fellow-man are those which govern the newspaper.

Every man has certain moral rights which every other man is bound to respect. Man being a social personality,

destined by his Creator to live in society, has those rights and owes those duties which naturally accompany the fulfilment of his destiny and are indicated by the requirements of his social nature. Among these rights is a certain property right in his "good name" or "reputation," that is, in the good opinion of him entertained by his neighbor. A man is entitled to credit in his neighbor's eyes for certain negative good qualities, and certain positive good qualities, and to the honor or esteem belonging thereto. He is entitled to the attribution to him by his relatives, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances, of (a) those good qualities naturally belonging to a human being as such and (b) such other good qualities which may reasonably be suspected to exist within him by reason of apparent evidence given by him; and he is entitled to the honor and esteem naturally attaching thereto.

Now a man may be robbed of his good name, i. e., the honor and esteem in which he is held by his neighbors, by the attribution to him of some disgraceful conduct, or by placing him in a ridiculous light. Moral theologians recognize two serious sins of this nature committed against a man, viz., calumny and detraction. The former consists of untrue accusations of disgraceful conduct and the latter truthful but unnecessary disclosure thereof. The libel law in England recognizes and punishes both offences, and the axiom, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel," well expresses an important principle. But libel law or no libel law, is is a true principle. It is needless to say that calumny is barred by its untruth, but the law against detraction is much less widely recognized and observed.

By whom and under what conditions may a man's good

name be taken away from him by a truthful disclosure and publication of disgraceful acts done by him but concealed from the knowledge of his neighbors? The common sense of the matter makes it quite clear that a man's "good name" may be rightly taken from him only by one (*a*) acting with authority under the government in the process of executing the law, or (*b*) acting as a private citizen with legitimate and sufficient reason arising from necessity for protection of his own rights.

For it is evident that to take away a man's good name is to injure him in his social relations as directly and definitely as if he were injured in his property or person. The law takes no man's property and injures no man's person save in exercise of the right to punish, and this right does not inhere in any individual citizen. The latter may rightly take no man's property and injure no man's person save in self-defense, in protection of his own rights. The *bonum famæ* is as tangible as other *bona*, and the same principle clearly applies to it as applies to the others. It is not a good objection that no one should enjoy a reputation or good name to which he is not in fact entitled, and that if, in the knowledge of B, A enjoys a good reputation though having done disgraceful things, B is fully entitled to make the truth known, thereby correcting the false impression and destroying the esteem in which A is held. For it is not in the moral competence of individuals to exercise the general punitive power which belongs to the government, and, besides, it is clearly not for the general good of society that every one's secret derelictions should be made public. Leaving the powers of government out of the case, it is evident that a private person is morally competent to take away the good name of another by any

means whatsoever within the limits of truth, only when and to the extent that it is necessary in defense of his own rights.

Now the newspaper's standing in society being that of any other private individual, for it is no part of the government, the paper can claim no powers in this matter beyond those that are enjoyed by every other private member of society. It will be fairly argued that in one important particular it differs from a private individual, in that it represents a great many individuals. The point is well taken. The newspaper does represent the many, but it does not thereby acquire any new kind of rights, or rights of a governmental character. It enjoys, if you will, the sum of the rights enjoyed by its readers, but in this sum are included no rights of a legislative, executive or judicial character. The newspaper represents "public opinion," if you please, but governmental powers are not derived from "public opinion," nor is "public opinion" the source of authority in the State any more than it is the source of the moral law. Where the newspaper's rights in the matter of a man's good name exceed the rights of a single individual is in the fact that it represents a large number of individuals and therefore may act in a great many more cases than would naturally concern a single individual acting as such in defense of his own rights. The newspaper may rightly act in the case of public men where public interests are legitimately concerned, where an individual citizen might not always be justified in acting.

But nothing save genuine public interest—and by interest is meant not public curiosity merely—justifies the newspaper in taking away a man's *bonum famæ* or good name, either by disgraceful disclosure or ridicule. For

example, suppose that a man in his youth committed theft, suffered imprisonment in a reformatory, was reformed, and in later life conquered for himself a position of honor and trust in another community and lived respected by his neighbors; under what condition would an exposure of his past life by a newspaper be justified? Certainly not upon the ground of mere sensationalism; certainly not upon the ground that the story would "interest" the public and sell the paper. If the man in question were summoned as a witness in a lawsuit on one side of the case, the counsel on the other in endeavoring to shake his testimony would perhaps be justified in bringing out in court the facts of his youthful disgrace. But not so the newspaper. The only conditions under which it would be so justified would be those under which the disclosure would be absolutely necessary to prevent the public suffering injury at the hands of the man in question. Otherwise the newspaper would commit a grave injustice, though its "story" might be true in every particular, and would be properly subject to punishment under a libel law clearly expressing the principles of justice in the case.

No novel is so interesting as a well-written biography, and nothing is so interesting to man as "personalities." but every individual has an absolute right to privacy and to his good name in all relations save those in which he occupies a position of genuine public importance to the community. The public man is entitled to his privacy and his good name in all his private relations. If these principles seem extreme, old-fashioned, out-of-date, and so on, in the light of modern newspaper practice, it is assuredly not the fault of the principles. If the modern paper claims jurisdiction over all the acts of every man,

we are entitled to ask where it got the charter giving it this jurisdiction.

And so, to recapitulate, the law of the newspaper demands: (1) The use of truth only; (2) Its use to the exclusion of scandal to the reader, and (3) Its use with due regard to the individual's *bonum famæ* and his rights thereunder. Is full recognition of these principles always found in combination with the reporter's happy possession of the "news instinct"? Do all newspaper offices inculcate them as part of the "cub's" training? Would it be impossible to teach them in a school of journalism? Would they be worth teaching? Does the modern newspaper admit their truth? The reader can answer these queries for himself. It is not a mere dispute as to good taste, but a definite moral question that is involved. That the principles described in the foregoing are true is certain if there be any law of right and wrong at all.

## In Defense of the Teacher

BY PAUL L. BLAKELY, S.J.

IS it a matter for wonderment that after twenty years of service in a grammar school, many a teacher regards the world with at least one jaundiced eye? Let us consider the query amicably. For two decades she has shepherded the lamblings of the flock, nor has she piped at noon-tide, as Amaryllis did with Corydon, under the shade of an aged aspen, tremulously whispering its never-ending story to the laughing, care-free brook. The age of fable is a book by Bulfinch, Theocritus has been dead these many ages, and this is the twentieth century in which we cannot afford to laugh as we work. She has a crook, this shepherdess of the public schools, but it is not tied with blue ribbons. If it was ever thus ornamented, the gay silken knots and strands of blue were long since bedraggled or quite worn away, in the constant task of prodding some heedless weanling into the narrow path, or of withdrawing him from the brake of bad grammar and the mire of cacography.

She is, in brief, no Watteau shepherdess, no flounced product of the famous art of Dresden. She is a matter-of-fact person who spends much valuable time in drawing up voluminous reports, and whose earlier notions of the sanctity of the individual's gifts and of the infallibility of Professor James, have been considerably modified by the tooth of time and experience. Her young belief in the angelic attributes of the child, she still retains, though qualified by the theological teaching that a third part of

the heavenly host fell from their high estate. If her life is not made up of fears within and battles without, the description at least approximates the reality. For any stick, as she has learned by experience, is good enough to beat a teacher with, whether it be a curriculum, a principal, a fond parent with a grievance, or a threat of dismissal.

Wielding almost as much influence on general school policy as the janitor, in the eyes of the public she is the first and last cause of whatever apparent shortcomings or positive absurdities may be detected in our magnificent and unparalleled system of enforced education. The kings rage and the teachers are punished. The School Board welcomes to its fair city, some new pundit with a get-educated-quick scheme of teaching, a principal must convert his school into a social center, a psychological laboratory or a university of sloyd and raffia, and when it is discovered that in reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic, eighth-grade Johnny ranks with the more advanced pupils of the mission schools in Van Diemen's Land or Monrovia, who is the scapegoat? Not all at once, please. Why the teacher, of course. \*

I am by way of having been a sort of a teacher myself, and therefore am never surprised at any charge which may be preferred against one of the craft. "The teacher is probably at fault" is a common attitude. Well may you start, and examine your conscience. Of you is the fable told. If the syntax of your pampered darling is of a type that would cause the late lamented Lindley Murray to shudder violently, forgetting your own lawless excursions into the land of verbs and pronouns, you rave as if the teacher were trying of set purpose to teach your boy a backwoods dialect. If, on the contrary, the

child of your bosom "always learns his book," like Mark Twain's good little boy, "never plays hookey, and is so honest that he is simply ridiculous," you at once subscribe wholeheartedly to the doctrine of heredity. The teacher has nothing to do with your offspring's progress in science and virtue. Some of his good qualities, you allow, he gets from his mother; but if you are like most fathers, you have no doubts as to the source of your boy's brains and his major claims to canonization. Meanwhile the harried teacher wonders happily why it is that your boy is so unlike his father, or is reflecting with a certain bitterness on the difficulty of teaching a child to write English when at home he is completely surrounded by slang, neologisms and *patois*.

Unless she is a novice, the teacher will be well aware that she is credited with the pupil's shortcomings only; that in an age which scoffs at miracles, she must be a second Thaumaturgus; and that although angels are excused when they have done their best, she is required by School Boards, principals, parents and the general public, to begin where the heavenly visitors leave off. Nay more; there is a general belief that she should be able to create a buoyant, brilliant intellect, inserting it into the soul of a child from whom the Infinite Creator, for good reasons, has withheld all but the essentials of a human understanding.

In few of these tasks does she succeed. But is she, therefore, to be blamed for the breakdown of American elementary education? Recently I listened with becoming reverence to a learned university professor who assured his audience that many public school teachers would further the progress of education by withdrawing to obscurity; and from his general tone I inferred that

he would consider them nearer their true vocation were they employed exclusively in washing dishes or in canning corn. This is probably as true as the judgment that, were justice done, many university professors would be found not only chairless, a condition sufficiently distressing, but also unable to dig and too proud to beg. Certainly, women may be found in the public schools and in our own, who lack the teacher's essential gifts of intelligence, sympathy, and patience; others there are who are teachers not by choice but by chance of fortune or force of circumstances, and who would change their work if they could. But no profession is judged by its incompetents, its shirkers. For a stipend fully equal to that of the street-cleaners in our most advanced cities, our grammar-school teachers devote themselves, often nobly and unselfishly, to the trying work of teaching the young idea to do a great many things besides shoot. I often wish that their splendid energy so skilfully devoted to their many difficult tasks might include the training of the whole child, not merely of his intellect and body.

But surely it is unfair to charge a teacher with incompetency, if the curriculum is as swollen as the liver of a Strasburg goose, or if she is confronted annually by a delegation of hopefuls, promoted not by virtue of any learning alleged to be in their possession, but because promotion is the rule. Either of these educational diseases cripples the efficiency of the teacher; when both are present, teaching can hardly be anything but a farce with the jokes left out. It is whispered, in fact stage-whispered, and emblazoned on the pages of the press, that in New York promotions are largely determined by the number of pupils for whom accommodations must be

found. "Teachers dare not be honest" is the blunt statement in the *Home News* for January 7. "The moguls who run the system demand a false percentage from the school, and insist on getting it. Teachers who honestly refuse to promote pupils soon learn that the men higher up disapprove of their action." The same charge is made by the New York *Herald* for January 12. "Children are hurried through the elementary schools," says this critic, "regardless of their fitness to advance from class to class. The whole idea is to keep the mass of children moving upward until they reach the 8B grade where most of them are dumped out into the world to begin the battle of life. The jam at the bottom is so tremendous that only by keeping the classes on the constant move can it be accommodated."

These criticisms are not quoted in the persuasion that they represent the exact truth. But it is fairly certain that they testify to tendencies existing in all large educational systems. What can the hapless teacher do in face of these difficulties, but bear the burden of the blame for pupils ignorant of the three R's? Experimentation in the schools, while costly, is an evidence of progress, and progress is bound up with "system." No individual can withstand a system, and few will care to try.

"I once wrote in my report," remarked a public school teacher, now a principal, to the writer, "that a certain boy was not to be promoted. I said that he was not only somewhat stupid, but lazy and indifferent." This was a grave error. Summoned to headquarters the teacher was cross-examined, and it soon became plain that she was on trial for this required statement of her professional opinion. She now knows that a boy must never

be accused of laziness. Laziness simply indicates the teacher's culpable inability "to arouse the pupil's dormant interest." Nor may she say that a pupil is stupid, first, because "anyone can teach a bright boy" as the bromide has it, and secondly, unless the teacher can rouse stupidity, or even twenty simultaneous cases of palpable stupidity, to transient gleams of cleverness, lasting long enough to light them through a set of examinations, she has mistaken her vocation, and should forthwith take up cooking or plain sewing.

In brief, the wise teacher will remark that while the pupil seems stupid, in reality he is suffering from adenoids, and that after some trifling medical attention he will bud into a very Solomon. If his adenoids have been recently removed, she will suggest that his undoubted but latent possibilities will be aroused by a change of environment. This done, with a sigh of relief she may gather up the débris and riff-raff of her class, and let it blossom into greatness under the warm sympathy of the new and smiling face which enlightens 6B across the corridor. True, before long 6B's introductory smile will change to a fixed glare, and the warm sympathy of the new environment to a cold antipathy, but what of that? As Thomas W. Lawson used to say with accusing capitals, We are All Victims of the Relentless System.

Perhaps this automatic promotion system has some cryptic connection with the fourteen-subject curriculum. I reason from an analogy which, however, I do not press. At the March Hare's Tea-party, a great many tea-things were set out, because there was no time "to wash the things between whilsts" and therefore, as the Hatter remarked, the guests "had to keep moving round." So generously supplied with "things" is the modern cur-

riculum that the pupils must skip joyously from place to place if all are to be even tasted. At least this is my explanation of that famous Seventh Chapter which is as full of puzzles and riddles as a modern curriculum, damp from the presses of New York, Gary, Oshkosh, or Fresno.

But exegesis is trying work. Whatever the connection between tea-parties, curricula, and the automatic promotion system may be, I merely suggest that we should not regard the teacher as low in intelligence because most of her pupils seem to be high-grade morons, and that we extend her that charity which Bret Harte did not refuse to the well-meaning, if incapable, mining-camp organist. She is not only well-meaning but, usually, efficient, and with very little sympathy and much unwarranted criticism, she is doing her best.

### "Catholic" Is Enough

EVER since the early part of the seventeenth century when the British Government succeeded in getting English-speaking Catholics to call themselves *Roman* Catholics, with the implication, of course, on the Government's part that there are other Catholics who are not Roman, many outside the Church have always insisted on calling us Roman Catholics. The Protestant followers of the Oxford Movement have been particularly tenacious of the term, because they consider themselves, according to their cherished branch theory, *Anglican* Catholics. Regarding the Church's mind on the question, Archbishop McNeil, of Toronto, apropos of a recent article in the *Ave Maria*, entitled "'Catholic,' and 'Roman Catholic,'" sent that well-edited weekly a letter containing the following quotation from the notes of Don Paulo Leva, a recording secretary of the Vatican Council:

"In the Dogmatic Constitution (chapter i) *de Fide*, the Fathers of the Council discussed the form proposed by the Theological Commission. This form began with these words: *Sancta Romana Catholica Ecclesia credit et confitetur, etc.* Thirty-six bishops objected to this form of words. The first (an archbishop) said: 'I should like to omit the word "Roman"; but if the Fathers wish to retain it, then I move that other words, such as "Apostolic," be added, and so arranged that it may be evident that we are not here giving the distinctive name of the Church, but a description of the Church, or an enumeration of the notes of the Church. We should not

favor, or even seem to favor, the error of those who teach that the Catholic Church consists of three separate branches, each of which should be called Catholic. Besides, it is a cogent argument in favor of the Catholic Church that we retain in daily use the very name used in the Apostles' Creed.' "

This amendment was subsequently embodied in the *Constitutio Dogmatica de Fide*, so it has the highest authority. The one word *Catholic*, therefore, is all that is needed to signify the Church governed by the Pope, and we should teach the non-Catholic world to know us and call us by that name only. For with us the word *Roman* is by no means restrictive to a species or section, as Anglicans would have it, but only declaratory of *Catholic*, and assertive of the Church's unity. Not only in our daily conversation and correspondence, therefore, but also in the press, in the courts, and in official documents and reports of all kinds, the simple word *Catholic* should be used to indicate a member of the "One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church," whose head is St. Peter's successor.